In addition to the progress occurring in different sectors, the attitude of the Afghan people has evolved. In this article, I will focus on the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) sector, which has played a vital role in the initial reconstruction of Afghanistan to date. I will try to analyze how the Afghan perceive these NGOs' activities and determine why there has been change so we may better understand their influence on Afghanistan's future.
There is no one agreed definition ofNGO. I will hereby use the word to signify a non-governmental, nori-po"litical, and non-profit organization which aims to pursue social welfare based on its own charter.
I will begin with a brief history ofNGO enrollment in the Afghan community and the development of NGO laws. Based on these, I will then examine the Afghan perceptions ofNGOs and causes for their change. In conclusion, with reference to Japanese aid policies, I will show the lessons learned for a better future for the NGO sector, the Afghan government, and the donor communities.
The content of this article is based on the personal opinion of the author, who has been serving as cJtf{!~s .
NGO Enrollment in Afghan Development
It was after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when many people poured into neighboring countdes as refugees, that the name NGO was popularized among the Afghan people. Protection efforts taken by these countries were generally limited because those Afghan people were not recognized as genuine refugees according to international law. It was only the NGO sector which could extend supplemental assistance to them. Initially, there were only international NGOs which were active in the camps. Gradually, those Afghans who learned to speak English joined the international NGOs and came to understand the NGO function, which provided a variety of public services on behalf of the government.
The 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was indeed impressive. Regrettably, the attention of the international community, with the exception of the NGOs, did not extend beyond this historic moment. Several years of internal conflict ensued among the local warlords who had once fought together against the Soviets. Many Afghan NGOs were barely established in the refugee camps. Yet they also began to extend relief activities and social services in areas within Afghanistan where local governments were unable. More than 200 international and Afghan NGOs were reported to be active by 1992. _Ev~n under the Taliban regime which began in 1994, the NGOs were the reliable aid providers.
However, with an increasing tendency towards Islamic extremism, the Taliban government's impression of the NGOs changed: they were now perceived to be spies of the West. In 1998 the government began expelling international aid agencies, including the United Nations (UN), from 
The Process to Establish the New NGO Law
The regulation of NGO activities has at least 10 years of history in Afghanistan, including the NGOs from paying (inappropriately) high salaries to local and foreign workers. It is a good step to improve transparency and purge the distrust surrounding NGO affairs. We hope that the regulation will override inappropriate personal relationships like corruption and nepotism."
Analysis of the Perception Change among the Afghan People
It is not an exaggeration to say that, without the help of NGOs, the current reconstruction of under the sup~rvision ofNGOs, private companies, or the local governments. In fact, the inability to distinguish between NGOs and private companies is as confusing for the government officials as it is for the local people. I suspect it is because the NGOs have played such an essential role in delivering social services for so long that many people have come to presume all service providers are NGOs. Therefore, while I often hear complaints of poor construction quality by NGOs, the truth of the matter is there has been no effort to determine whether the quality of work done by the private sector or local government is any better than the NGOs.
My fourth point stresses the recent change of the Afghan government's development strategy. The goal of the current Afghan government is private-sector led economic growth. To achieve this, it focuses on the rehabilitation of the infrastructure and the development of human and institutional capability. The new regulation to prohibit NGO enrollment in construction works can be argued as in line with this strategy. The government officials firmly believe that the private sector is the engine for sustainable ewnomic growth. In spite of the shared opinions among the donor communities that the limited ability of the government institutions and the fragile economic infrastructure are more serious than the inefficiency of NGO activities, the government dared to pull the NGOs away from the mainstream of future reconstruction activities. Throughout the movement, I can see a strong determination of the Afghan government to shift its driving force from 'reliance on others' to a 'self reliance' approach.
Lessons Learnefl for an Improved Future
Here are the lessons learned from the experience of Afghanistan.
i ) For ·the donor communities
It is interesting to see the situation of Afghanistan from a Japanese viewpoint. The Japanese approach to foreign development assistance is based on a firm belief, from its own experience after World War II, that development assistance should support the self help effort of developing countries. This uniqueness will explain the fact that, compared to the Western countries, the loan component share is much larger in the total Official Development Assistance (ODA). This philosophy is also consistent with the grant assistance through NGOs. A typical scheme is the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Project (GAGP). GAGP does not support the costs for administration and contingencies. It is required that some burden should be borne by the recipient side (NGO or local community) so that it can understand the project belongs to itself and thereby develop a sense of ownership. This idea has so far been effective even in Afghanistan. GAGP has earned a high reputation from the local communities, NGOs, and the Afghan government for its quality and quick impact. This approach is not common among donor communities. Many Western donors use a contract form, as opposed to grant or donation, for development projects implemented by NGOs. This type of contract basically allows the costs for administration and contingencies. Furthermore, these donors prefer to make contracts with international NGOs. It is a common practice for an international NGO to enter into a subcontract with a reliable Afghan NGO and then the latter creates a further subcontract with its umbrella NGOs. By deducting a commission at each subcontract stage in the name of administration cost, the final amount to reach end beneficiaries becomes very small. The situation nat':lral)y results in a poorer quality of services. This is one of the reasons the Afghan government feels suspicious about the ineffectiveness of project implementation through NGOs. The experience in Afghanistan may cause enough of a commotion in the donor communities for them to reconsider the efficiency and effectiveness of their aid schemes.
ii) For the Afghan government
The structure of the Afghan government is still so fragile that it is not ready to provide full social services on behalf of the NGOs._The Minister has full influence on the policy decision; however the content and its background are rarely shared among relevant departments within the ministry. It is no wonder that provincial and district level government officials are not well-informed. This situation often causes confusion particularly in the NGO's field operations. The Afghan government as well as the media and the general public simply expect that many capable NGO staff will return to the government once they give up re-registration as an NGO under the new NGO law. But this is too optimistic. The salary level of a government official ($40 to $50 per month) is almost one tenth of that of an NGO employee (and far less than that of UN agency personnel). Moreover, the current economic situation surrounding the infrastructure does not allow business opportunities to develop very rapidly.
So for the time being, the government should really be concerned about their brain drain to foreign countries.
The Afghan government pays less attention to or misunderstands many key components of genuine NGO activities, one of which is the involvement oflocal communities in the project cycle. In the case of a commercial contract with a private company, the local people tend to pay little attention to the maintenance because they are not involved in the project planning and implementation processes. In addition, as the mission of private sector is to earn profit, the companies prefer to employ cheaper labor from neighboring countries, which may cause a hitch within the Afghan labor market. (The symptom is already seen in road construction works.) The other point is about profit gained through NGO activities.
It is widely acknowledged that a NGO can produce profit as long as it will be used for the NGO's original objectives. But many Afghan people, particularly among the intellectual population, presume the professional NGO should be treated like a volunteer group and thereby be denied any monetary gain.
·u s"hould be noted that at the beginning of the reconstruction period, many NGOs were burdened with an aid fund beyond their capacities. The situation led many people to be misguided and tarnished the virtue of the NGOs. However, we should not presume that all NGOs are ineffective and useless. The Afghan government is expected to understand this and provide an environment for each sector to maximize its capability. I do not believe that the current tendency among the Afghan people to reject much of NGO activities will last long. I am more worried that a new corruption may spread among government :lUthorities as a result of certain gigantic private companies, mostly construction enterprises, being treated warmly by the government. The situation surrounding the economic development of Afghanistan will inevitably require the help of genuine NGOs in the near future again.
At that time, everyone will need to understand that the government and the NGO are not mutually exclusive but are meant to exist together.
iii) For the NGO community
The NGO sector needs to work harder to get support from the local community and the government.
Many NGOs tend to pay more attention trying to meet the donors' requirements than the needs of the local community and government. For example, when I visit GAGP construction sites for a monitoring and handing over ceremony, I am often surrounded by community representatives who ask if the NGOs really accomplished those projects according to the originally approved budget. It is true that our limited budget often can not absorb all of their needs in a project. But this kind of experience reveals that the NGO has not been diligent in explaining the details of the project to the local community. It is easy to imagine how a small misunderstanding among the local people can grow into a large scale distrust of the NGO sector.
In this sense, it is a welcomed sign that the major NGO coordination bodies are aware of the need to enhance accountability and transparency of NGO activities. In fact, they jointly announced the introduction of the NGO Code of Conduct in May 2005. When the new NGO law was being established, it was argued the signing of this Code should be a prerequisite for NGO re-registration. Although it was not realized, this initiative was warmly accepted by both local and international NGOs.
With the enforcement of the new NGO law, many organizations are expected to convert to private companies. The Ministry of Economy estimates the total number of re-registrations will be reduced to only 300 to 350. Although it is hard to say what an appropriate size of the NGO sector should be, it is an absolutely welcomed measure that fake NGOs will be shunted aside. Some NGO directors are concerned that the prohibition of their enrollment in construction works may limit the scope and effectiveness of their activities. However, this transition process should be accepted by the NGO sector as an opportunity to improve their collaborative and implementation skills. I believe their toughness and wisdom, which were fostered in the consecutive hardships of the refugee camps, the Taliban regime, and the chaotic atmosphere in early 2002 will surely help overcome the present difficulty to make for a brighter future for all of Afghanistan.
In conclusion
Time flies and global circumstances change very rapidly. In the past four years, the major concern of the international community has already shifted to Iraq. It is mandatory for the Afghan government to seek a more efficient and effective use of its limited donor funds in order to realize its self reliant economic development plan as soon as possible.
I think the perception change ofNGOs is a positive example that the Afghan people are in line with this goal. As they continue to revise their perceptions ofNGO activities, the people of Afghanistan will take on the challenge of the post conflict difficulties and in so doing, become a role model for those in other peace building nations.
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